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TEACHING THE RULES OF “TRUTH” 
JANE H. AIKEN* 
Purpose and Construction: These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion 
of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.1 
Sometimes I chuckle, other times I panic, when I reflect on the fact that as 
an Evidence teacher, I am ostensibly in the business of teaching the rules to get 
to truth.  Imagine that.  “I know the rules and I am going to teach them to you 
so that you can use those rules and get to truth yourself!”  I wonder sometimes 
how I manage to hold my head up on that first day of Evidence class and 
discuss the purposes of the rules of evidence.  Could there be a more 
impertinent statement than, “The rules of evidence are designed to ensure the 
admission of undistorted evidence that will help the trier of fact evaluate the 
evidence and arrive at the truth?”  I say that without once engaging in the 
philosophical discussion of what do we mean when we say “truth,” although I 
imagine that might improve my teaching.  But of course, if I did that, I might 
never get to all the exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
Nevertheless, the modern Evidence course offers a unique opportunity to 
involve students in activities in which virtually no other course regularly taken 
in law school asks them to engage.2  Instead of studying appellate cases in 
which the facts have already been found, students in Evidence think about how 
lawyers present those facts so that they can be “found.”3  It is both a 
deconstructing and a constructing endeavor with the ultimate goal being that 
the fact-finder finds the truth.  While we are training students how to reduce 
 
* William M. Van Cleve Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law.  
The author wishes to thank Katherine Goldwasser for her insights into teaching and grasp of the 
scope and importance of these issues, and for her excellent, comprehensive, and generous editing 
and also Mark Cooke, my research assistant, for his tireless efforts to find support for sometimes 
unsupportable propositions. 
 1. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 2. I am not the first to write about how procedure courses are ripe teaching tools for social 
justice lessons.  See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gendering and Engendering Process, 61 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1223 (1993). 
 3. Evidence courses used to be taught via the study of appellate cases, but the teaching 
methodology has shifted to a more problem-based approach in recent years. 
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complex legal problems into meaningful bits of evidence that give a picture of 
what happened, we also can teach them to appreciate how often truth depends 
on point of view.4  The context in which rules are applied deeply affects their 
meaning.  Such an insight transcends the Evidence course and can help open 
students’ eyes to the fact that even facially neutral procedural rules implicate 
social justice concerns.5 
Students are often aware of substantive problems with the justice system, 
particularly the criminal justice system.  The recent spate of post-conviction 
exonerations has heightened this awareness.6  Innocence projects across the 
country have drawn attention to the perils of eyewitness testimony and all-too-
frequent incidences of coerced confessions, shoddy police practices, and 
prosecutorial misconduct.  The prevalence of racial disparity at every stage of 
the criminal justice process has also been widely noted.7  The attention given 
to exonerations and the deep racial bias embedded in our criminal justice 
system provides an opportunity to raise questions about how the rules of 
evidence might not lead to truth when the defendant does not share the same 
world view as the largely majoritarian police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
judges, and jurors who make the system work.8 
One of the most important functions for the rules of evidence is to create a 
rubric in which accurate judgments can be made about the facts of cases.  The 
law of evidence poses as a “neutral” body of procedural law, based in rational 
decision-making and immune from questions of values.  The goal of a trial is 
to facilitate the presentation of a sufficient amount of evidence about a past 
event so that any fact-finder can bring to bear his or her “general knowledge” 
of how the world works to determine what happened and what the outcome 
should be.  The idea is that the fact-finder applies common sense to rationally 
 
 4. It can also be a course in which point of view is disguised.  See Ann Althouse, The Lying 
Woman, The Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88 NW. U. L. 
REV. 914 (1994). 
 5. Teaching social justice lessons can be a bit dicey.  One runs the risk of being “preachy” 
or becoming a talk show host instead of a law school professor.  For an interesting article about 
this danger, see Frank Rene Lopez, Pedagogy on Teaching Race & Law: Beyond “Talk Show” 
Discussions, 10 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 39 (2004). 
 6. Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do With It?: A Commentary on Wrongful 
Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1315, 1316. 
 7. See generally Samuel R. Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Special Theme: The Other 
Race-Effect and Contemporary Criminal Justice: Eyewitness Identification and Jury Decision 
Making: Jury Decision Making: White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black 
Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201 (2001). 
 8. See generally Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the 
Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5 (2004); Sylvia R. Lazos 
Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of Law That Is Inclusive?: What Grutter v. 
Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity on the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101 (2004). 
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produced evidence.9  The problem with this fundamental assumption 
underlying all of evidence law is that when the trial involves a litigant whose 
experience differs from the “general knowledge” of the world, the rules of 
evidence not only have a difficult time coping with the litigant’s alternate 
world views, but often actively silence them.10  General knowledge, therefore, 
might better be read as “dominant (and sometimes inaccurate) view.”11 
This Essay offers a few examples of ways in which Evidence professors 
can engage students in critical analysis of how deeply a point of view can 
influence the way the Rules apply.  My hope is that through this understanding 
the students will no longer think of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a neutral 
body of procedural rules that if faithfully applied will result in “truth.”  I 
believe this insight is one of the most critical that a law student can gain in law 
school.  It will make students more thoughtful in their analysis and application 
of the Rules, but more importantly, it will make them better critical thinkers 
and, ultimately, better lawyers. 
Point of view is critical to the operation of the relevance rules.  The 
Federal Rules define relevance as “any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the [litigation] more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.”12  The students confront what appears 
to be a neutral and impartial rule that merely calls for the application of logic 
to determine admissibility.  Nevertheless, relevance rules are particularly 
susceptible to “invisible” bias.  What is relevant depends on one’s perspective. 
For those outside the mainstream of judges (which is a great many people), 
the perspective and experience brought to bear in determining relevance have 
significant implications.  A suspect’s “nervousness” when approached by a 
police officer might be offered to show consciousness of guilt.  Generally, a 
judge would not be nervous if a police officer approached him or her.  Only if 
one had something to hide, a judge might think, would the approach of a police 
officer cause alarm.  An excellent example of this phenomenon is Justice 
Scalia’s biblical foray in California v. Hodari.13  In Hodari, some young 
people saw the police and ran, and the police gave chase and eventually 
arrested one of them on drug charges.14  Scalia wrote for the majority and at 
one point in the opinion, after noting that the state had conceded the police did 
 
 9. See generally Symposium, Visions of Rationality in Evidence Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 847. 
 10. See Marilyn MacCrimmon, The Social Construction of Reality and the Rules of 
Evidence, 25 U.B.C. L. REV. 36, 39 (1991). 
 11. This has been empirically demonstrated in the race context.  See, e.g., Sommers & 
Ellsworth, supra note 7; Chet K. W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil of 
Ignorance, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 373 (2005). 
 12. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 13. 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
 14. Id. at 622–23. 
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not have reasonable suspicion (which clearly angered him), gratuitously opined 
“[t]hat it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young men who 
scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of the police is not self-evident, and 
arguably contradicts proverbial common sense.  See Proverbs 28:1 (‘The 
wicked flee when no man pursueth’).”15 
Therefore, the evidence of the suspect’s nervousness makes it somewhat 
more likely than it would be without the evidence that the suspect is guilty.  
Taken from another perspective, that of a person continually harassed by 
police officers, the “nervous behavior” does not indicate consciousness of guilt 
but rather fear of police abuse.16  If this were the reason for the suspect’s 
nervousness, the evidence would be irrelevant.  However, given the minimal 
threshold of Rule 401, the fact that the nervousness might be explained by 
consciousness of guilt is sufficient to establish relevance.  The question then 
becomes, how much weight does one give to the evidence when rules requiring 
an evaluation of weight, like Rule 403, are brought to bear?  This is when point 
of view has its greatest effect.  It is likely that the judge’s evaluation of weight 
will be considerably different from that of the person continually harassed by 
police. 
Rule 403, the unfair prejudice rule,17 can be used to exclude evidence out 
of concern that juries will overvalue it, but the Rule is certainly under-utilized 
in this way.  Normally evidence professors focus on the gruesome photograph 
or evidence of the witness’s engagement in morally questionable behavior as 
classic examples of material giving rise to a Rule 403 objection.  Such reliance 
misses an opportunity both to teach a more nuanced understanding of Rule 403 
and to engage the students in a firsthand experience of how weight depends on 
 
 15. Id. at 623 n.1.  Of course, occasionally judges understand the outsider perspective.  In his 
dissent in Hodari, Justice Stevens responded to Justice Scalia on this point: 
The Court’s gratuitous quotation from Proverbs 28:1, see ante, at 623, n. 1, mistakenly 
assumes that innocent residents have no reason to fear the sudden approach of strangers.  
We have previously considered, and rejected, this ivory-towered analysis of the real world 
for it fails to describe the experience of many residents, particularly if they are members 
of a minority.  See generally Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 
Yale L. J. 214 (1983).  It has long been “a matter of common knowledge that men who 
are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being 
apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses.  Nor is 
it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that ‘the wicked flee when no man pursueth, 
but the righteous are as bold as a lion.’”  Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 
(1896). 
499 U.S. at 630 n.4. 
 16. See generally David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving 
While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999). 
 17. Unfair prejudice is but one of several grounds for excluding evidence under Rule 403.  
For purposes of this analysis, I am focusing on the unfair prejudice dimension of the rule.  See 
FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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point of view.  Several Evidence scholars have used the case of People v. 
Adamson18 to do just that.  Taking their lead,19 I first give the students these 
facts: 
Josey Smith has been murdered.  When the police arrived at the scene, they 
found her body sprawled on the floor.  She had been stabbed with a knife.  Her 
stockings had been rolled down her legs and the tops of the stockings were cut 
off. (I remind them that the case took place many years ago, and she wore 
stockings, not pantyhose.).  For reasons that do not matter here, the police get a 
warrant to search Paul Wilson’s house.  Mr. Wilson is an African American 
male who works as a dock worker at the docks near his home.  While 
searching his apartment, they find a drawer full of the tops of ladies’ stockings.  
None of these stocking tops matched Josey Smith’s stockings.  Paul Wilson is 
indicted for the murder. 
My first question to the students is, “Is the evidence that Mr. Wilson had a 
drawer full of stocking tops relevant to the prosecution’s case?”  Invariably, 
my students have said “yes.”  I then ask them to tell me what inferential links 
they would make to find such evidence relevant.  I get an answer something 
like this: “A woman who has been murdered had the tops of her stockings cut 
off.  It is unlikely that the woman wore her stockings that way on purpose.  It 
seems far more likely that the cutting of the stocking tops was related to the 
murder.  That being the case, the person who murdered the woman must have 
had had some kind of interest in the tops of women’s stockings.  A man who 
keeps tops of women’s stockings in a drawer has some kind of interest in such 
stocking tops.  Paul Wilson must have some kind of interest in the tops of 
women’s stockings.  The evidence showing that he has such an interest makes 
it somewhat more likely, than it would be without the evidence, that he is the 
man who killed her.” 
After going through the relevance analysis, I then ask, “What about a 
possible 403 objection?  Is there any potential for unfair prejudice?”  A student 
usually suggests that the prejudice might be that the jury might think Mr. 
Wilson is kinky and might punish him for that (or at least be less concerned 
about wrongly convicting him for the murder) and not use the evidence for its 
relevant purpose.  Other students have suggested that the jury may not have 
clear knowledge that the defendant’s stocking tops do not match the victim’s 
stockings, and as such they could overvalue the evidence as a result.  On the 
whole, however, the bulk of the students believe that such prejudice does not 
substantially outweigh the probative value. 
 
 18. 165 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1946). 
 19. This problem was developed by Katherine Goldwasser and is discussed in her article, 
Response to Edward J. Imwinkelried, the Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho: Refocusing on 
the Bottomlines of Reliability and Necessity, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 227, 232–33 (2000).  She credits 
Laird C. Kirkpatrick and Christopher B. Mueller, the authors of a well-known Evidence text, with 
the idea.  See id. at 232 n.23. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1080 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1075 
I then ask, “What if the evidence was that Ms. Smith was found murdered 
and her T.V. was missing.  Mr. Wilson’s house was searched and they found a 
T.V. but it wasn’t the same T.V. that was missing from the victim’s house.  
Would that evidence be relevant in his prosecution for murder?”  The students 
readily answer that this would not be relevant because there is not enough 
connection. 
I then follow with “How are stocking tops different from a T.V.?”  
Students point out that stocking tops are peculiar . . . it is too much a 
coincidence that she had stocking tops missing and he had stocking tops in his 
drawer.  I then probe what they mean by “peculiar.”  “How do you know that it 
is peculiar?  How important is the idea that it is peculiar to your assessment of 
probative value and unfair prejudice?”  The students agree that the peculiarity 
is the critical aspect of this evidence giving it both relevance and weight. 
Finally, I ask, “What if I told you that at the time of these events, Mr. 
Wilson processed his hair and that it was very common at the time for African 
American men to put stocking tops on their hair to protect it when they 
worked.  Furthermore, as a dockworker, he and many of his coworkers, both 
white and black, routinely wore stocking tops over their hair to protect it from 
the material that comes down on them when they are unloading ships.  Does 
that change your mind as to its probative value and unfair prejudice?”  I then 
engage the students in a discussion about how the probative value is decreased 
because it is not peculiar for Mr. Wilson to have tops of stockings in his 
drawer given his cultural and employment background.  The unfair prejudice is 
great because the jury may draw the same conclusions that the students did at 
the beginning of the analysis. 
I have found that leading the students through this analysis leads to insight 
because they experience firsthand the confusion and prejudice that Rule 403 is 
designed to prevent.  More importantly, they get a life lesson as lawyers about 
thinking through a case and not jumping to conclusions about relevance and 
probative value without understanding the context in which it arises.  Point of 
view makes all the difference.  Indeed, I often find my questioning short-
circuited as an African-American student understands immediately the 
prejudice of admission of this evidence and educates the rest of us about the 
use of stocking tops.  I leave the students with the question, “What if you had 
been representing the defendant in this case and had failed to object to this 
evidence or had failed to educate the judge or jury about the lack of peculiarity 
of this item of evidence?  Would the evidence presented at trial, having cleared 
the rules of evidence, help lead to the truth?” 
Character evidence rules are rich with possibilities for exploring the impact 
of point of view.  Character rules are based on the optimistic idea, expressed in 
Rule 404(a), that people are not defined by their past acts: once a thief, not 
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always a thief.20  Known as the “propensity rule,” this optimistic idea allows 
the Evidence professor to discuss the ways in which the rules of evidence can 
be used to level the playing field, to avoid the everyday shortcuts in judgment 
that we rely upon in daily life and focus the fact-finder on the events that gave 
rise to the litigation.  Not using the past as indicative of present behavior (she 
did X in the past, so she must be the sort of person who does X, so she 
probably did X on the occasion at issue in the lawsuit) is very different from 
how people often make decisions.  The justice system’s insistence on dealing 
with the present, not the past, is worth discussing with students.  At the same 
time, the insistence that the past is not admissible to prove action in conformity 
also demonstrates how evidence rules encourage juries to evaluate individual 
acts without regard to context.  For those individuals who have suffered under 
racial, gender, or class bias, however, the context of their acts can explain a 
great deal.  I try to teach this with the following problem: 
Wilma Washington is being tried for the murder of her husband.  She has 
asserted self-defense and is prepared at trial to testify about the years of abuse 
that she suffered from her husband.  The prosecution plans to impeach her 
testimony at trial with her confession on the night of the murder.  She had 
called 911 and said, “I have killed my husband.”  When the police arrived at 
the house, she was sobbing over his body and took full responsibility for her 
husband’s death.  When asked who caused her bruises, she had told the officer 
that she had fallen down the steps.  When the officer on the scene asked if her 
husband had abused her, she had significantly downplayed any history of 
abuse.  At trial, however, Wilma testifies that her husband beat her daily over 
eleven years of marriage and that recently the beatings had become more 
frequent and more brutal.  The prosecution offers her confession both to 
impeach her current testimony about the events and as substantive evidence of 
her guilt. 
The defense attorney seeks to offer into evidence the testimony of a physician 
who had examined Ms. Washington, three years prior to the killing.  The 
physician had treated her in the emergency room for a broken nose, dislocated 
jaw, and small round burns on her chest.  The doctor will testify that the doctor 
suspected domestic abuse and asked Ms. Washington about whether Mr. 
Washington had inflicted the wounds.  The doctor is prepared to testify that 
 
 20. The Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 404(a) refer to the California Law Revision 
Commission’s rejection of a rule permitting the admission of character evidence to indicate action 
in conformity.  As quoted in the Advisory Committee Notes, the Commission said: 
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial.  It tends to 
distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on the 
particular occasion.  It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and punish 
the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case 
shows actually happened. 
FED. R. EVID. 404(a) Advisory Committee’s Notes. 
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when asked that question, Ms. Washington immediately began defending her 
husband and downplayed the violence. 
I then ask the students: “What is the relevance of the doctor’s testimony?”  
The students first see it as evidence of past abuse but then at some point, a 
student will say, “It shows that when confronted with questions about her 
abuser’s behavior, she covers for him and downplays the violence.  This is 
relevant to show how much (or how little) weight the jury should give the 
confession.”  I next ask, “Is it admissible for that purpose?”  “What kind of 
evidence will the prosecution say this is?”  (Propensity evidence) “What are 
the hurdles she must clear?” (Getting them looking at Rule 404). 
The student will often look to the “mercy rule,” Rule 404(a)(1), as a way to 
introduce the doctor’s description of Ms. Washington’s behavior as evidence 
of a “pertinent trait” of  her character.21  I ask, “If offered as 404(a)(1) 
evidence, what form must that evidence take?”  If the student does not spot the 
problem, I point them to the Rule’s restriction requiring that proof of a 
“pertinent trait” of character be in the form of opinion or reputation evidence 
but not by evidence of specific acts.22  That will severely limit the doctor’s 
testimony if the court determines that this is a “pertinent” trait.  In order to get 
the specifics in, the student might turn to Rule 404(b) and argue that the 
evidence is offered for another purpose akin to a common scheme or plan.  
However, this evidence appears to lack the specificity and identity that would 
permit it to get out from under the fatal “propensity” label and constitute a 
“common scheme or plan.”23 
Thus the character bar may well limit Ms. Washington’s ability to show 
how she was socialized to defer to men, how she has downplayed violence in 
the past, and how she might readily confess to acts she did not do or fail to 
focus on possible defenses because of her history with the batterer.24  Without 
this evidence, the finder of facts has only his or her own experience to draw 
upon.  What looks like irrational behavior to the “average” viewer (it makes no 
sense to think that a victim of violence at the hands of her husband would ever 
seek to downplay what he was doing to her), might, in fact, be quite rational in 
light of the context.  The general, “rational,” view may not capture the 
experience of the battered woman and may therefore lead to wrong 
conclusions.  Once again, application of the rules by a neutral mind is not the 
path to truth. 
 
 21. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
 22. See FED. R. EVID. 405. 
 23. See Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts 
Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 786–87 (1980). 
 24. See Kersti A. Yllo & Murray A. Straus, Patriarchy and Violence Against Wives: The 
Impact of Structural and Normative Factors, in PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES: 
RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES, at 383, 392–94 (1990). 
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Conceivably, the defense could try to address this problem by calling an 
expert witness who could provide important background or context for the jury 
to use in assessing the believability of Ms. Washington’s version of events.  
Before such an expert would be permitted to testify, however, the proponent 
would have to contend with a significant obstacle.  In effect, the proffered 
testimony would go to Ms. Washington’s credibility.  But under the rules of 
evidence, experts generally are not allowed to make credibility assessments 
because witness credibility is thought to be well within the jury’s ken.25  This 
general restriction on expert testimony is another opportunity to explore “the 
rules of truth.”  Jurors are perfectly able to assess credibility without the help 
of an expert because fact-finders share the ability to use their “common sense” 
to evaluate witness demeanor, hesitancy, eye contact, and inconsistency.  
These “credibility attributes” are assumed to be the same for all witnesses, no 
matter what their age, gender, class, race, or ethnicity is, or the context in 
which such statements are made.  In short, jurors are ostensibly experts in 
“human behavior” and as such, to make credibility determinations, they need 
only draw upon their universally applicable ideas about what indicates lack of 
truthfulness.  These supposed “givens” fly in the face of the social scientific 
literature on the subject, which makes clear that notions of what constitutes 
“typical” evasive behavior, such as an unwillingness to look someone in the 
eye, are actually culturally specific.  Thus, for example, an unwillingness to 
look someone in the eye is viewed as a strong sign of dishonesty in American 
culture.26  That behavior in other cultures would not indicate a lack of 
truthfulness at all, but rather deferential behavior appropriate in a courtroom.27  
In such a case, the rules of evidence may thwart, instead of foster, truth. 
The same assumption that fact-finders bring a shared universal 
understanding of facts can be seen in evidence law’s treatment of admissions 
by silence.  The Federal Rules permit fact finders to infer statements from the 
silence of a party when, as the Advisory Committee points out, “the person 
would, under the circumstances, protest the statement made in his presence, if 
untrue.”28  The Notes go on to say that “[t]he decision in each case calls for an 
evaluation in terms of probable human behavior.”29  The meaning of a 
person’s silence, like eye contact, can depend on culture as well as experience.  
Truth here is a matter of point of view.  The party may be merely reticent about 
contradicting another, may be suspicious and therefore silent, or may be 
inattentive due to incapacity caused by drug withdrawal or another condition 
 
 25. Although, “beyond the jury’s ken” is not a standard articulated in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, judges often use it in their determination of whether an expert is needed. 
 26. William Y. Chin, Multiple Cultures, One Criminal Justice System: The Need for a 
“Culutural Ombudsman” in the Courtroom, 53 Drake L. Rev. 651, 659 (2005). 
 27. Id. 
 28. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) Advisory Committee’s Note. 
 29. Id. (emphasis added). 
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that one would not want aired in front of a fact-finder.  Yet the Rule assumes 
universal cultural competence, leaving little room for such differences.  
Admissions by silence may also silence truth. 
Not all rules of evidence are substantively neutral.  The recently adopted 
exceptions to the character rules with regard to child abuse and sexual 
assault,30 provide an avenue for discussion of why we would select these 
particular past acts to be singled out for different treatment rather than others.31  
To highlight these issues, I offer the following problem: 
Michael Tsosie is charged under two separate federal statutes with child sexual 
assault and fraud.  The indictment alleges that Mr. Tsosie was employed at a 
child care center that offered care for the children of federal employees, a 
position he allegedly obtained by making fraudulent misrepresentations on his 
application for the position.  The child sexual assault charges were brought 
after a parent of a 4-year-old child in the day care center alleged that Mr. 
Tsosie fondled the child on three occasions while the child was in his care.  As 
part of its case in chief, the prosecution intends to offer a witness who will 
testify that the defendant fondled her thirty years prior when she was six years 
old and he was her caregiver.  When she told her parents of his acts, they 
immediately fired Mr. Tsosie.  Her parents did not report the incidents to the 
police at the time because the witness was reluctant to talk about the 
molestation and they did not want to put her through a trial.  The parents are 
now deceased.  The witness says she still has a clear memory of what Mr. 
Tsosie did to her, and when she heard that he had been given a position of trust 
caring for young children and was charged with child molestation, she felt it 
was her duty to come forward. 
The fraud charge in the indictment was added when this witness emerged, 
because the employment application for the child care center asked if Mr. 
Tsosie had ever been fired from a job caring for children and he did not 
disclose the thirty-year-old firing.  In support of the fraud charge, the 
prosecution intends to call a witness who was a former employer of Mr. 
Tosie’s.  This witness will testify that Mr. Tsosie had filled out an application 
to work at the witness’s place of business just last year, that the application had 
asked about firings within the past five years, and that Mr. Tsosie failed to 
disclose on the application that he had been fired from another position the 
year before for drinking on the job. 
I then ask the students, will either of these two prosecution witnesses be 
permitted to testify?  What objections are likely to be raised by the defense?  
 
 30. FED. R. EVID. 413–15. 
 31. See generally David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, Other Crimes Evidence in Sex Offense 
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529 (1994); Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other 
Criminal Acts Evidenced in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713 (1981); Jane Harris 
Aiken, Sexual Character Evidence in Civil Actions: Refining the Propensity Rule, 1997 WIS. L. 
REV. 1221 (1997). 
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What arguments will the prosecution make to try to meet those objections?  
How should the court rule? 
This permits a discussion of the fact that the propensity to lie on 
employment applications, although fresh and relevant to the charge, would not 
be allowed under Rule 404’s character bar.  However, the prior acts of child 
sexual abuse would not be barred by Rule 404 since they are permitted under 
Rule 414.  There may be an argument to preclude the evidence under Rule 403 
but that would focus on problems with this evidence other than character.  
Why treat the character testimony differently?  Unlike the subtle analysis that 
is required to identify how supposedly “neutral” rules have a negative impact 
on “outsiders,” Rules 413 and 414 offer a real opportunity to discuss how 
procedural rules can be used substantively to disfavor a despised group.  These 
Rules facilitate law enforcement’s tendency to “round up the usual suspects” 
and then compound the chance of wrongful conviction by having the very 
evidence that may have placed the defendant under suspicion to begin with be 
used to prove the charged conduct.  This significantly undermines the 
presumption of innocence that is part of what prompts the general character bar 
reflected in Rule 404.  The result may be a wrongful conviction at odds with 
the truth of these events. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that sometimes cultural context 
does matter.  There are rules designed to minimize the effect of cultural 
preconceptions that are thought to cause people to give undue probative value 
to certain types of evidence.32  These are “truth-seeking” rules.  They operate 
on the theory that excluding evidence is sometimes necessary in order to try to 
ensure that deeply rooted but unfounded preconceptions are not indulged.  One 
of the primary rules of evidence that is designed to remedy the problem of 
giving undue probative value to a type of evidence is Rule 412,33 the so–called 
“Rape Shield Rule,” which limits the admissibility of evidence of a sex offense 
victim’s sexual past in both criminal and civil cases.34 
Rule 412 offers very specific guidance in its criminal application for when 
evidence of a victim’s prior sexual behavior or predisposition can be offered.  
However, unlike the criminal section of the Rule, the civil section of Rule 412 
leaves the determination of admissibility to the discretion of the judge.35  The 
judge weighs whether the evidence’s “probative value substantially outweighs 
the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.”36  
Again, I use a problem.  This one is based on an Eleventh Circuit opinion. 
 
 32. See generally Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs’ Sexual Pasts: Coping with 
Preconceptions Through Discretion, 51 EMORY L.J. 559 (2002). 
 33. FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 34. Aiken, supra note 32, at 559.  In 1994, Congress made significant changes to the Rules, 
including clarifying the criminal Rule and extending it to civil actions.  Id. 
 35. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2). 
 36. Id. 
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The plaintiff, Ms. Judd, brings a tort action against the defendant for wrongful 
transmission of a sexually transmitted disease.  She asserts a damage claim for 
both physical and emotional injury.  She alleges that she contracted herpes 
from the defendant and she feels depressed and dirty due to the infection.  At 
trial, the defendant offers testimony about the plaintiff on several subjects, 
including: the fact that she had breast augmentation surgery before she met the 
defendant, her past sexual activity, and her employment as a nude dancer.37 
I ask the students to analyze each piece of evidence to determine its 
relevance and its admissibility under Rule 412.38  The students readily identify 
that the evidence of the plaintiff’s prior sexual activity is directly relevant to 
causation of a sexually transmitted disease.  Therefore, this evidence has high 
probative value with little unfair prejudice or harm to the victim, provided that 
whether the defendant was the source of the plaintiff’s disease is at issue.  The 
students have much more difficulty with the breast augmentation and 
employment as a nude dancer.  Most suggest that these have little probative 
value to her claim in the lawsuit and thus should be excluded under Rule 412’s 
balancing test.  I then tell the students that the problem is based on a real case, 
explain that the trial court in the case admitted both items of evidence, and 
share with them some of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of these rulings on 
appeal. 
I find three aspects of the opinion particularly useful for class discussion.  
First, there is a brief background discussion of appellate review of district court 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, in which the court says that although 
such review is ordinarily highly deferential, review of rulings under Rule 412 
is “more [stringent] in view of the presumption of inadmissibility of evidence 
of an alleged victim’s sexual behavior or . . . predisposition.”39  Second, there 
is a review of the trial court’s “weighing” under Rule 412 of the probative 
value of the nude dancing evidence against its possible unfair prejudice or 
harm to the plaintiff, in which the appellate court approves the following 
reasoning: the fact that plaintiff worked as a nude dancer both before and after 
she contracted the sexually transmitted disease gave the evidence real 
probative value vis-à-vis plaintiff’s claim that she was distressed and felt 
“dirty” after she contracted the disease; and the fact that a good deal of other 
evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual history and predisposition was properly 
admitted at trial meant there was little or no prejudice.40  Third, there is the 
court’s treatment of the plaintiff’s claim as to the breast augmentation surgery 
evidence.  Although the court did not actually reach the merits of this issue, its 
handling of the issue was telling.  Here, the ruling was that the plaintiff had 
 
 37. Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339, 1340 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 38. Whether Rule 412 applied was raised on appeal but was not decided.  Id. at 1341–42. 
 39. Id. at 1341 n.6. 
 40. Id. at 1343. 
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waived any objection based on Rule 412, because her objection at trial had 
been on relevancy grounds.41 
I begin with the waiver of objection ruling.  At first, this strikes the 
students as perhaps unfortunate for the plaintiff, but hardly noteworthy as a 
matter of evidence law; they learn early-on all about the pitfalls of failing to 
preserve evidence issues for appeal.42  But then I begin exploring with them a 
number of questions about the ruling, such as, “What bearing do you think it 
might have had on how the plaintiff framed her objections below that the case 
was in effect being tried as though Rule 412 did not even apply?”43  Also, 
what, if anything, are we to make of the fact that Rule 412 is, in fact, a 
relevancy rule?  When I move to the nude dancing evidence ruling, I begin by 
asking whether, under the logic seemingly approved by the court, if we 
substitute “bank teller” for nude dancer, the probative value would be the 
same?  If there is laughter in response—and there often is—I remind the 
students that Rule 412 was designed to neutralize the effect of knowing that the 
plaintiff was engaged in a profession that is code for sexual promiscuity.44  The 
Eleventh Circuit’s analysis does not treat the nude dancing as neutral.  The 
defendant’s relevance logic seems to go something like this: because Ms. Judd 
can continue in her profession as a nude dancer, it is more likely that she does 
not feel dirty than without the evidence.  Perhaps the court has engaged in 
more offensive logic: because Ms. Judd engages in nude dancing, she has a 
less credible claim to “feeling dirty” than without the evidence.  Both  kinds of 
relevance logic rely on the now impermissible inference that one can use 
lifestyle evidence to extrapolate sexual behavior and beliefs.  If we truly 
neutralize the sexually coded profession of nude dancer by substituting “bank 
teller,” the court’s decision makes no sense.  Plaintiff’s employment as a bank 
teller before and after the event would offer us no insight into whether her 
claim that she “felt dirty” was genuine. 
To wrap up the discussion, I ask the students to, in effect, take a step back, 
and think about what Rule 412 calls on judges to do in civil cases and why that 
might be problematic.  The Rule appears to assume that, unlike the jury, the 
judge can evaluate probative value unencumbered by the very cultural 
 
 41. Id. at 1342. 
 42. See FED. R. EVID. 103. 
 43. The defense claimed that Rule 412 did not apply.  Judd, 105 F.3d at 1340.  The trial 
court demonstrated explicit skepticism about its applicability and refused to rule.  See id. at 1341.  
In fact, the Eleventh Circuit never ruled on the issue either.  Id. at 1342. 
 44. The Advisory Committee’s Notes say: “This amendment is designed to exclude evidence 
that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the proponent believes may 
have a sexual connotation for the factfinder.”  FED. R.  EVID. 412(a) Advisory Committee’s 
Notes. 
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preconceptions that gave rise to the need for an exclusionary rule to begin 
with.  I hope they will come to appreciate the irony.45 
The impact of point of view arises even in the simplest of evidence rules.  
Rule 804 permits the admission of hearsay evidence in limited situations in 
which the declarant is unavailable.46  The Rule specifies the circumstances in 
which there is assumed to be unavailability.  That definition includes when 
[the declarant] is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has 
been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance . . . by process or other 
reasonable means.  A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if . . . absence is 
due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the 
purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.47 
I examine these requirements using a problem drawn from a Tenth Circuit 
opinion, Garcia-Martinez v. City and County of Denver.48 
Jose Garcia sued the Los Angeles police department for police brutality after 
sustaining significant neck and back injuries during an arrest in east L.A.  Mr. 
Garcia is an undocumented person from Honduras.  During the litigation, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a deportation order.  Before that 
order was executed, however, the Plaintiff, Mr. Garcia, gave a deposition about 
the events that led up to his claim of brutality.  After that deposition but before 
the case got to trial, Mr. Garcia voluntarily surrendered to the Immigration 
officials rather than being subject to surprise arrest on the street or in his home.  
Mr. Garcia was then deported to Honduras.  The defense is aware of his 
deportation.  Despite Mr. Garcia’s absence, the case proceeds. 
At trial, the plaintiff’s attorney seeks to offer Mr. Garcia’s deposition in lieu of 
his testimony, relying upon Rule 804(b)(1).  The defense objects.49 
I ask my students to identify the potential grounds for objection.  Because 
it is a deposition done in the same case, they note that the objection must be 
based on the failure to prove unavailability.  I ask the students what showing 
the plaintiff must make.  I ask the students whether showing the deportation 
order would be sufficient to show unavailability.  Most say yes.  Some suggest 
that his voluntary surrender undermines his claim of unavailability.  I ask if 
they would think he was unavailable if he had been arrested and then deported?  
 
 45. The fact that judges are as human as jurors in their inability to disregard information that 
is not relevant to the proceedings is empirically documented in Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris 
Guthrie, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of 
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005). 
 46. FED. R. EVID. 804. 
 47. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5). 
 48. 392 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 49. Id. at 1189–90. 
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I then offer the opinion.  The Court did not find Mr. Garcia unavailable.50  It 
said: 
  In applying the rule, we look at two factors to determine “unavailability.”  
The first factor is whether the proponent was able to “procure” the witness’s 
attendance “by process or other reasonable means.”  Garcia-Martinez does not 
literally meet this requirement since he voluntarily failed to return to Colorado 
for trial.  The second factor looks to whether the absence is “due to the 
procurement or wrongdoing” of the proponent of the testimony.  Garcia-
Martinez also does not literally meet this requirement, since his absence at trial 
was calculated. 
  Confronting the rule’s plain language, Garcia-Martinez again asks us to 
apply a “good faith” exception.  His argument is that the absence from trial 
must be for the “purpose of preventing the witness from attending or 
testifying.”  Fed.R.Civ.P. 804(a).  Since his absence was due to exigent 
circumstances beyond his control, the court should find him “unavailable” 
under the rule.  We disagree that he is entitled to an exception on this record.51 
Mr. Garcia’s lawyer appears to have assumed that the deportation papers 
would be sufficient. They were not.  I next ask the students to consider the 
following hypothetical: 
Joe Smith is a plaintiff in a civil action seeking damages.  His deposition is 
taken.  Before the case goes to trial, Mr. Smith, a member of the Army 
Reserves, is put on active status and sent to Iraq.  He is deployed and is not 
present at the time of trial.  The plaintiff’s attorney requests that his deposition 
be used in lieu of testimony.  The attorney offers evidence of Mr. Smith’s 
deployment to prove the evidentiary requirement of unavailability. 
How should the court rule?  Should Mr. Smith have refused to go when called 
and risked arrest in order to show unavailability?  If Mr. Smith does not 
attempt to get leave to go home from Iraq, does that defeat his lawyer’s claim 
of unavailability? 
When students attempt to draw different conclusions than the court in 
Garcia-Martinez, I ask them to explain how these hypothetical facts differ 
from the case.  This discussion is rich with attempts to make distinctions that, 
 
 50. Id. at 1193. 
 51. Id.  In dissent, Judge Lucero criticized the narrow reading of unavailability and said: 
I neither agree that he procured his own absence from trial, nor that he made an 
insufficient showing of a good-faith effort to be available for live testimony.  His absence 
was procured by the United States government.  In August of 2000, officers of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service deported Garcia to Honduras, and at all times 
relevant to this action, he has remained under a standing deportation order.  It is true he 
left the country on his own after filing the present action, but the law is no less 
compulsory to someone who complies with its dictates under fear of reprisal than for 
someone who waits for the corrective power of the state to do it for him. 
Id. at 1195. 
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when pursued, become distinctions without a difference.  Most students are 
unwilling to require that Mr. Smith not answer to his call to activate in order to 
be “available,” and the requirement to show that he sought permission to leave 
the field of battle to prove “unavailability” seems a waste of time.52  It is not 
lost on the students that this is a circuit court opinion, presumably subject to 
significant thought and review.  I close this discussion by asking them how this 
evidentiary ruling, which ends any chance of resolution of the litigation, helps 
move the fact-finder toward truth and fair administration of justice as required 
by Rule 102.53 
These are a few examples of problems that can be used in an Evidence 
course to remind students that even though the goal of the rules of evidence is 
to arrive at “the truth,” the truth may be a function of point of view.  As critical 
race theory and the incidence of “driving while black” has taught me, as a 
white woman, my experience of seeing a police car in my tail lights is very 
different than a black man’s experience of the same event.  Yet it is my 
“general” perspective that often is privileged in the rules of evidence.  Thus, 
rules of evidence implicate deep questions of social justice.  As Evidence 
teachers, we need to equip our students with the tools to follow the injunction 
of Rule 102 “that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly 
determined.”54  Teaching Evidence as a course provides an important avenue 
for teaching about complexity and about how hard it is to get to the truth, how 
non-neutral supposed neutral rules actually are, and how attention to process as 
much as attention to substance can ensure that we get closer to the truth.55  
Coping with the rules of evidence requires both planning and spontaneity.  It 
requires strategic thinking and effective oral advocacy.  It requires the ability 
to dissect a case into its component parts, evaluate the evidence, and present 
the story so to expose the embedded point of view.  Students who are attuned 
to this bring a critical analysis to their approach to law that makes them far 
more perceptive and, ultimately, better lawyers.  More importantly, such 




 52. Students inevitably point out that it is entirely likely that the court would grant any 
request to delay the trial until after Mr. Smith’s tour of duty.  As with many hypothetical 
questions, it is important not to permit the “easy out.”  Because we know that Mr. Smith will 
eventually be back in the state legitimately, there may be a clear distinction between the two 
cases.  This does not explain why the Garcia-Martinez court did not grant a continuance in order 
to try to procure Mr. Garcia’s presence in his case against the state. 
 53. FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive 
Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002). 
